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When Two Giants Collide: Article 17 and
the Scope of Trademark Protection
Afforded Under the TRIPS Agreement
KATJA WECKSTROM*
I. INTRODUCTION
International intellectual property law overtly merged with
international trade law in 1995 in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("the TRIPS
Agreement"). Although both fields of law have a long
international history, each operates on fundamentally different
premises. While international trade law focuses on removing trade
barriers, intellectual property rights are territorially limited and
hence, by definition, barriers to trade. The 'merger' was
accompanied by an unforeseen depth of commitment by sovereign
nations to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and its rules.
While bringing a new subject matter within the trade regime
broadened the scope of international economic regulation, the
enforcement mechanism established within the framework of the
WTO also seemingly rendered international trade law more
pervasive than ever in relation to its subjects.2 Thus, at least from a
formal point of view, the international trade regime of today is a
system governed by the rule of law, not that of diplomacy.'
* IP Fellow and Visiting Adjunct Faculty at Chicago-Kent College of Law. LL.D.
Candidate at University of Turku, Finland. The author would like to thank Graeme
Dinwoodie, Sungjoon Cho, and Sarah Harding for valuable comments and discussions
during the writing process.
1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2. See Gary P. Sampson, Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3-4 (Gary P. Sampson ed., 2001).
3. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2003);
Martin Wolf, What the World Needs From the Multilateral Trading System, in THE ROLE
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These changes naturally trigger a number of questions. What
is the scope of the TRIPS Agreement and how should its
provisions be interpreted under existing rules of international law?
Do national legislators continue to serve a function within the
international trade regime, other than being mere implementing
organs? In trademark terms, is the minimum standard of
trademark protection set forth in the TRIPS Agreement really a
maximum standard of other Intellectual Property ("IP")
protection? To what extent does the international level of
trademark protection in the TRIPS Agreement restrict the ability
of the national legislator, under international law, to regulate
within the area of trademark law and other areas of law?
Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth the minimum
standard of trademark protection that Member States are
obligated to afford.' However, Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides that Member States are allowed to provide for limited
exceptions to the afforded rights.' In European Communities-
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs ("the GI-report"), the WTO
Panel had to resolve the relationship of Articles 16 and 17 to other
provisions of the TRIPS agreement, namely, Article 24, which
affords protection for Geographical Indications ("GIs").'
One of the most contested issues in the international trade
and intellectual property arenas arises when the protection of
trademarks conflicts with the protection of GIs. The GI-report
gives some insight into what international trademark law
mandates. That same report also gives some guidance on how
conflicts between different IPRs should be resolved. This Article
provides a deeper analysis of the coexistence of rights in the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement-a relationship that will
inevitably grow in importance when trade-related issues permeate
all WTO IP issues.
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 185;
see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS
ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 181 (2000).
4. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16; see Appellate Body Report, United
States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, 186, VT/DS176/ABIR (Jan. 2,
2002).
5. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 17.
6. See Panel Report, European Communities -Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1 7.632, 7.637-.686,
WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC Panel Report].
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As existing international trademark law has yet to fulfill the
market regulatory function it serves on the national level, this
Article adopts a new approach to analyzing international
trademark law. First, a study of three cases around the world
reveals how and when trademarks can be viewed as property
through use of different property concepts. Then, the Western
concept of trademarks as property (derived from possession) is
contrasted to the Maori concept of property (derived from the use
of property).
The property discussion is not new to trademark law in the
United States or elsewhere, nor is a discussion on the significance
of trademark use in trademark law.7 Here, however, the
discussions are combined and analyzed in an attempt to provide a
framework for deciding international trademark cases. This
Article is not primarily concerned with a defendant's use of a sign
as a trademark, nor the proprietor's right to property. Instead, it
argues that the property rights in a trademark should be assessed
through its use; any finding of infringement hinges upon whether
the proprietor's use of the trademark is unlawfully affected by a
third party's use of an identical or similar sign. The focus is neither
on the proprietor nor on the mark itself, but on the protected use.
Second, the analytical framework is supported by an analysis
of the international legal system. Then, the analytical framework,
informed by property theory and international law, is applied to
the issues raised in the GI-report. This leads to the conclusion that
the GI-report is flawed in certain respects.
This Article argues that the text of the TRIPS Agreement,
when infused with the general principles of public international
law, although seemingly vague, provides a binding analytical
framework for assessing the legitimate scope of trademark
protection under international law. The existing analytical
framework can be derived from three sources: (1) the minimum
standard of protection set forth in the agreement under Article 16,
(2) the degree of derogation allowed from the afforded rights
7. See Ilanah Simon, Embellishment: Trade Mark Use Triumph or Decorative
Disaster, 28(6) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 321 (2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.
Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law 17 (Univ. of Iowa College of
Law, Working Paper No. 06-06, 2006), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=927996. See
generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777 (2004).
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under Article 17, and (3) the context and structure of the TRIPS
Agreement
The analytical framework rests on a contextual approach to
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement Just as the meaning of each
word in each provision rests not only on the ordinary meaning of
the word, but also on the context in which it is used, the meaning
of each provision should be interpreted in context with the other
provisions of the treaty. This Article argues that an overly literal
interpretation, with the effect of drawing arbitrary lines between
different intellectual property rights ("IPRs"), is inconsistent with
the TRIPS Agreement."
Section II. explores the nature of the rights Article 16(1) of
the TRIPS Agreement guarantees trademark owners by
scrutinizing trademark rights as a legal concept. The Article
approaches this question by way of analogy to property law; it
inquires to what extent trademark rights can be viewed as
8. After determining that a right may be limited by a country's regulation, the Panel:
[E]xamines whether Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement requires Members to
make available to trademark owners the right [and if] it does, [it] will consider
whether Article 24.5 provides authority to limit that right and, if Article 24.5
does not, conclude . . . by assessing whether Article 17 or Article 24.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement permits or requires the European Communities to limit that
right ....
EC Panel Report, supra note 6, 91 7.519. "A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus
upon, the text of the particular [treaty] provision to be interpreted." Appellate Body
Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 9 114,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report]. If the
ordinary meaning is equivocal or inconclusive, then "the object and purpose of the treaty
as a whole may usefully be sought." Id. Hence, a panel should address the questions in this
order, i.e. from the specific to the general.
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (8th ed. 2004) (defining context as "the
surrounding text of a word or passage, used to determine the meaning of that word or
passage"); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 820-21 (2d ed. 1989) (defining context as the
"connected structure of a writing or composition" or the "whole structure of a connected
passage regarded in its bearing upon any of the parts which constitute it; the parts which
immediately precede or follow any particular passage or 'text' and determine its
meaning"). But see PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 98 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the interpretive approach in which the
interpretation that furthers the objective and purpose of the treaty prevails over the one
that runs contrary to it).
10. See generally EC Panel Report, supra note 6, TT 7.631-.632 (stating that because
Article 24(3) appears in section three of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, the reference to
"this Section" is therefore a reference to section three, which sets out standards for the
protection of GIs, and that the scope of Article 24(3) was limited by the introductory
phrase "[i]n implementing this Section").
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property" and explores how different understandings of property
influence interpretation of international trademark law. This
analysis serves as a foundation for determining how viewing
trademark rights as property affects the rights when interacting
with other interests in society, i.e. when the rights clash with other
equally fundamental interests.
Section III focuses on the relationship between the explicit
limitations set forth in Article 16(1) and the limitations that are
allowed by virtue of Article 17 in light of the GI-report 2 The GI-
Panel was faced with a complaint that a European Community
regulation protecting GIs allegedly encroached upon the minimum
level of trademark protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.
Section IV approaches the TRIPS Agreement through the
interpretive lens of general rules of international law and
international trade law. 3 According to customary international
law, treaty provisions should be interpreted narrowly. On the
other hand, they should not be interpreted so as to render the
provisions ineffectual, since each treaty provision was intended to
have an effect. 4 Thus, an interpretation giving some provisions
more effect than others is inconsistent with the general objective
and purpose of the treaty. Much like WTO panels should not act
as an international legislature through activist interpretation,
WTO panels should not employ "passivist" interpretation by
stalling progress or by shying away from areas of political
contention. WTO panels, instead, should interpret the TRIPS
Agreement and its provisions in the legal framework and practical
context in which they operate. Absent express wording on the
specific issue to the contrary, a hierarchy of intellectual property
rights should not be presumed to have been included in the TRIPS
Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement itself-its mere adoption as
well as its structure -supports a presumption of equality.
11. Cf Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (2004) (stating that "the propertization of IP ... appears to
be irreversible [but] not as absolute as it is often claimed to be.").
12. See generally EC Panel Report, supra note 6, $ 7.644-.686 (discussing how the
EC regulations protecting GIs are justified under Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement).
13. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 25.
14. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press)
(2005) ("[A] treaty must be given an interpretation that enables its provisions to be
'effective and useful,' that is, to have the appropriate effect."); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 602-07 (6th ed. Oxford Univ. Press)
(2003).
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In Section V, the analytical framework produced by this
analysis is developed to define the scope and limits of what
constitutes the minimum standard of trademark protection under
international law. This Article argues that the GI-Panel's reading
of the TRIPS Agreement is counter-intuitive; it creates a hierarchy
of IPRs that would require Member States to restructure their
protective schemes. It is further argued that the TRIPS
Agreement-implicitly and explicitly-stands for a presumption of
co-existence of rights and the Agreement's provisions should be
interpreted accordingly. The TRIPS Agreement does not exist in a
vacuum and its interpretation should reflect this.
II. THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF ARTICLE 16(1): TRADEMARK
RIGHTS AS A LEGAL CONSTRUCT
A. Trademark Rights As Property
This Article assumes that trademark rights are property
rights. However, this assumption is limited in terms of the
information it reveals. The property label only has meaning in the
context of property law, which regulates the rights of that which is
designated as "property."" This section seeks to ascertain how a
property right can be defined at the time of its allocation, as well
as later when conflicts with other rights emerge. In trademark
terms, we seek guidance in defining the object of the right, i.e. an
answer to the following question: what do you own when you own
a trademark? Three cases, one decided by the Constitutional
Court of South Africa and two by the European Court of Human
Rights serve as illustrative tools. Each case involves a non-
traditional taking of property without compensation. Hence, the
cases raised issues concerning whether the object constituted
constitutionally protected property and whether it, nonetheless,
could legitimately be subject to a taking without compensation. In
other words, when evaluating a proprietary interest one must
always ascertain whether the object and holder satisfy the
requirements for receiving protection and, if so, whether societal
considerations of necessity still outweigh the individual interest in
receiving protection in the circumstances of each individual case.
15. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 29-31
(1988) (discussing the problems associated with defining property law).
[Vol. 29:167
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In First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v.
Commissioner,6 three leased cars had been seized by the Revenue
Service for the lessee's unpaid customs debts. First National Bank,
the owner of the cars, challenged the government's authority
under the constitution to sell the seized vehicles, since they were
the property of a third party.'7 Section 25 of the South African
Constitution contains a negative guarantee of property rights in
the form of protection against arbitrary deprivations. 8 Although a
large portion of Section 25 concerns issues regarding real property,
it expressly states that property is not limited to land. " After
extensive theoretical and comparative analysis of Section 25, the
court held that the provision authorizing the sale was
unconstitutional.
The court concluded, on the one hand, that the protection of
property in the negative does not include an express guarantee of
the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property. On the other
hand, the court acknowledged a guarantee of the right to be free
from arbitrary deprivation of property.2 The same right extends to
both natural and juristic persons;' it is, however, not absolute, but
subject to limitation based on societal considerations.22
The approach to the interpretation of Section 25 has to be
contextual in order to reflect this nature of the right. In the words
of the court, "[t]he subsections . . . must not be construed in
isolation, but in the context of the other provisions of section 25
and their historical context, and indeed in the context of the
Constitution as a whole. ' '23 The court cites Professor A.J. van der
Walt when it states that it is necessary "to move away from a
static, typically private-law conceptualist view of the constitution
as a guarantee of the status quo to a dynamic, typically public-law
view of the constitution as an instrument for social change and
transformation under auspices [and control] of entrenched
16. First Nat'l Bank of S.A. Ltd. v. Comm'r for the South African Revenue Servs. 2002
(4) SA 768 (CC) paras. 2-5, 7-10 (S. Afr.).
17. Id.
18. S. A'FR. CONST. 1996, art. 25(1).
19. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 25(4)(b).
20. See generally First Nat'l Bank, 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras. 25, 71 (considering
approaches followed by other democratic systems when deciding what constitutes
"arbitrary" deprivation).
21. Id. paras. 41, 45.
22. Id. para. 49.
23. Id.
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constitutional values," when considering the purpose and content
of the property clause." Hence, property should also serve the
public good.
As an initial matter the court notes that any interference with
the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property involves
some degree of deprivation of the title holder's rights. A
deprivation per se cannot trigger a duty to compensate. The
invalidity of a deprivation hinges upon whether it can be viewed as
arbitrary. 6 Arbitrariness should be evaluated in the legislative
context to which the prohibition against "arbitrary" deprivation
has to be applied as well as to the nature and extent of the
deprivation.27 More specifically, it is to be determined by
evaluating the relationship between the means employed and the
ends sought, as well as the relationship between the purpose for
the deprivation and (1) the person whose property is affected, (2)
the nature of the property, and (3) the extent of the deprivation. A
more compelling purpose needs to be established when the
deprivation affects land as opposed to other property as well as
when the deprivation embraces all the incidents of ownership as
opposed to affecting only some rights in the bundle of rights. 8
Similarly, in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom,
the European Court of Human Rights agreed with the petitioner
that the English law on adverse possession, as applied, violated
their fundamental right to protection of property.29 Under the law
of adverse possession the possessor can acquire lawful title (by
way of initiating a registration procedure), if the owner has not
asserted rights of ownership against the possessor of land in twelve
years." Petitioner, a company, was the registered owner of twenty-
three hectares of agricultural land. After the termination of a
grazing agreement between petitioner and the Grahams in 1984,
the Grahams continued to graze the land without permission until
1999. The action before the court arose when the Grahams applied
24. Id. para. 52 (emphasis and bracketed text in original) (quoting A.J. VAN DER
WALT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 11 (1997)).
25. Id. (emphasis and bracketed text in original) (quoting VAN DER WALT, supra note
24.)).
26. Id. paras. 57-61.
27. Id. para. 66.
28. Id. para. 100.
29. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep.
3, 43 (2006).
30. Id.
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to the registration authority for transfer of title pursuant to the law
of adverse possession and petitioner subsequently lost lawful title
to the land?'
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 32 secures the right of
"peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions," except when
deprivation is in the public interest, as provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law.33 According to previous
case-law by the European Court of Human Rights, a deprivation
must comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a
legitimate means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought in
order to satisfy the general principle of peaceful enjoyment.'
Nonetheless, the court recognized that the national legislatures
should be shown great deference in determining how to further the
public interest and such determination could only be overturned if
it is "manifestly without foundation.""
The existence of alternatives is not enough to render the
contested legislation unjustified. The proper inquiry is whether the
interference strikes "a fair balance between the demand of the
public or general interest of the community and the requirements
of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.
36
Although a deprivation of property without compensation can be
legitimate, the compensation terms set forth in the relevant
legislation are important to assess the deprivation's fairness and
ultimate legitimacy."
The court stressed that unlike other property that is
inherently subject to restriction, qualification or limitation, the
petitioner's title to land was absolute. The mere fact that a law of
general applicability was in effect at the time of acquisition did not
inherently limit petitioner's property right. Whether a law of
general applicability can ever do so depends on whether the law
can be seen as qualifying or limiting the right, i.e. take effect, at the
31. Id.
32. Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. I, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter ECHR
Protocol], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HtmlO09.htm.
33. Id. art. 15.
34. See Bruncrona v. Finland, App. No. 41673/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28, 604 (2005);
see also J.A. Pye, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, at 55-56.
35. J.A. Pye, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, at 56.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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moment of acquisition rather than pending certain circumstances
at some time in the future. 8 Due to the fact that petitioner had
registered title to the land and the public interest therefore was
weaker than in the case of unregistered property, the transfer of
title to the possessors without compensation was greatly
disproportionate to the total revocation of petitioner's property
interest." In the end, the decision seemed to turn on the fact that
the law did .not require that the owner be given notice during the
twelve-year time period.'
Of the seven justices on the court, three dissented." The
dissenters stressed that ownership carries not only rights, but
duties as well. The duties imposed on petitioner in this case could
not be viewed as excessive or unreasonable, since petitioners were
professional real estate developers and therefore should have had
full knowledge of the law as well as the minimal steps required to
look after their interests. Since the convention only imposed a
minimum standard of protection and it is open to national
legislatures to heighten the level of protection, the majority's
decision was unduly influenced by the legislature's decision to
modernize the law of adverse possession. 2
In Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, the European Court of
Human Rights concluded that a trademark application can give
rise to a protectable property interest based on legitimate
expectations. 3 Anheuser-Busch argued that the enjoyment of a
property right afforded at the time of application could not be
disturbed absent specific law to this point." A Czech holder of a GI
had successfully opposed the trademark application in extensive
opposition proceedings. 5 Consequently, the trademark registration
never issued.
38. Id. at 57-58.
39. Id. at 62-63.
40. Id. at 63. The court placed great weight on the fact that the act had been amended
in 2002 to include a requirement of notice after ten years of possession. See id. Throughout
the opinion the court emphasized that the applicant was deprived of (1) property (2)
without compensation (3) without the ability to contest the decision in court. See id.
41. Id. at 65 (Maruste, Garlicki & Borrego Borrego, JJ., dissenting).
42. Id. (Maruste, Garlicki & Borrego Borrego, JJ., dissenting).
43. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, para. 47 (2005),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for application
number "73049/01", then follow the link for the Oct. 11, 2005 decision) (last visited Apr.
22, 2007).
44. Id. para. 32.
45. Id. paras. 12-16.
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The court concluded that a conditional right will not be
realized if it conflicts with the rights of third parties, provided that
legislation to this effect is clear and precise at the time of
acquisition of the right." The mere fact that some protection is
afforded (a right of priority) from the time of application does not
necessarily mean that the property interest involved is absolute.47
The dissenting judges placed weight on the great economic
value of the right conferred by trademark applications in
contemporary society and recognized a protected property
interest, namely the exclusive right to use the mark for named
products in a certain geographic area.48 They seemed to view
trademark law as wholly unsatisfactory in the modern world, since
they concluded that a result that renders a valuable asset
unexploitable in some markets amounts to interference with the
peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions."9 The dissenters therefore
concluded that the Portuguese legislation failed to strike a fair
balance between the public interest sought and the individual
property interest.'0
In contrast, the Maori system is premised on a theory of
property allocation that hinges not on the owner or object of the
property but on the ownership rights to use a resource in a specific
manner.1 Before being replaced by the British property system all
land was communally owned and the community granted
individual members of the community multiple usufructuary
rights. 2 Instead of obtaining a piece of land and all rights to it, the
Maori had rights, for example, to hunt, cultivate land and pick
berries.53 The community owned the geographical space, which
allocated and enforced the usufructuary rights as well as enforced
its rights against other communities. 4 Several members thus could
hold rights in the same geographical space, but they were different
rights that did not encroach upon each other." Members were
46. Id. para. 50.
47. Id. paras. 47, 52.
48. Id. para. 5 (Costa, J. & Barreto, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (Costa, J. & Barreto, J., dissenting).
50. Id. paras. 5-8 (Costa, J. & Barreto, J., dissenting).
51. See Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-
Century New Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 811 (1999).
52. See id. at 814.
53. See id. at 811.
54. See id. at 814.
55. See id. at 811.
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encouraged to exercise their rights to their fullest extent without
harming others, which put all land to its most efficient use to
service the needs of the community. 6 Unlike the Western system
that focuses on the owner, in the Maori system what defines the
scope of the right is its use.
Dressed in trademark terms, as long as the trademark is used
to indicate the origin of goods or services, the owner of the mark is
irrelevant for the question of ascertaining whether the mark is
protected or not. In other words, the property right is alienable as
long as its function in the overall system of allocation is not
altered. The question is purely whether the use is legitimate in
relation to the interests of third parties. Whether based on
registration or use, the right exists as long as, and to the extent, it is
used according to the initial allocation. Some boundaries may be
encroached, which is actually desirable, in order to maximize the
use of all resources. 7 In the event of a conflict, whoever furnishes
proof of a legitimate interest in continued use of the disputed
subject matter will prevail. Regardless of the outcome of the
dispute, the rights are presumed to coexist to the extent that they do
not conflict with each other. When the use stops, the rights by
default revert back to the community or the government pending
certain circumstances set forth in legislation." Although the
current system is arguably based upon similar logic, the
contemporary emphasis on individual property rights has clearly
overshadowed this premise of trademark law."
In sum, all of the decisions referenced above treat property in
land differently than other property interests and are more likely
to view the property right in land as one of absolute ownership. By
the same token, not all deprivations of land are illegitimate, since
only some trigger the duty of compensation. All property systems
recognize that property rights are not absolute; there are, however,
56. See id. at 814.
57. See id. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 347, 350 (Harold F. Williamson & Gertrude Tait
eds., 1967) (asserting that property rights develop to internalize externalities when the
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization).
58. Banner, supra note 51, at 814. After all, it is the government and not the
individual rights holder that enforces the use rights of the individual against encroachment
from others. See id.
59. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEx L.
REV. 1031, 1071 (2005). See generally Demsetz, supra note 57, at 347 (stating that an
owner of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him to act in
particular ways).
[Vol. 29:167
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great variances between countries in which private property rights
are subject to limitations in the public interest.' Consequently,
while some rights can be taken away, some rights were never
granted in the first place.' All property rights are thus inherently
subject to internal as well as external limitations.
In comparison, a mobile phone consists of patented hardware,
copyrighted software, and a protected design, and it is marketed
under a protected trademark. All these rights exist apart from the
property right in the mobile phone itself. This solution caters to
needs of the contemporary dynamic community. Likewise, the
Maori system optimally served the needs of their community,
because the same geographic area cannot be hunted, grazed or
cultivated indefinitely or it will be drained. Similarly, trademark
owners need to constantly develop their trademarks to fit their
products and business. The extent of the actual use therefore
rarely completely coincides with the mark that is registered at any
given time. However, the option of fixing the right to a physical
object is not available in trademark law. While the English system
that replaced the Maori system was arguably more efficient, the
same system encounters its weaknesses in relation to IPRs. The
physical connection distorts rather than aids the attainment of
efficient allocation and forces the IPR system to race between the
extremes of insufficient protection of third parties to insufficient
protection of rights holders. A theory of allocation that focuses on
the use, instead of the owner or object of property rights, will
allow for a near optimal allocation of rights on both sides, as it is
inherently flexible to the needs of the users as well as the
community.62 In other words, a balance is continuously struck
between competing interests both when allocating rights for use
and in resolving conflicts of those rights.
What purpose, then, does the two-step deprivation analysis
set forth in the South African case serve in treaty interpretation?
Professor Joost Pauwelyn categorizes conflicts that arise in treaty
interpretation as inherent conflicts, apparent conflicts, and genuine
60. See, e.g., Banner, supra note 51, at 811.
61. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, para. 47 (2005),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for application
number "73049/01", then follow the link for the Oct. 11, 2005 decision) (last visited Apr.
22, 2007) with J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, 43 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 3, 65 (2006) (Maruste, Garlicki & Borrego Borrego, JJ., dissenting).
62. See also Lemley, supra note 59, at 1048-50, 1071.
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conflicts.63 In matters of international trademark law, a false
conflict might arise when trademark rights are impacted by
legislation. Careful scrutiny, however, reveals that the trademark
owner does not have a legitimate property interest in the subject
matter that has allegedly been deprived. The majority in
Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal reached this conclusion. Likewise, the
legislation might not legitimately allow a third party to encroach
upon the contested subject matter and hence the apparent conflict
of norms was an illusion.
Unlike false conflicts where the decision turns on the lack of a
protected interest on either side, a true apparent conflict requires
the decision-maker to consider the arbitrariness of a deprivation in
light of the public interest, since both parties have legitimate
interests in the contested subject matter. Balancing of interests is
required and guidance is sought from the contextual framework of
the conflicting provisions as well as the general rules of treaty
interpretation. A genuine conflict of norms, where the object and
purpose of the agreements or provisions in question undeniably
conflict, cannot be resolved through treaty interpretation, but can
only be resolved by the legislature.'
B. The Contents and "Meaning" of an Exclusive Right
As mentioned above, the term "property" in itself bears no
legal significance. The significant aspects of property lie in the
rights it confers upon its holder-a bundle of rights. The
traditional bundle includes (1) the right to lawfully use the
property in a certain way, (2) the right to alienate (i.e., the right to
sell, lend, lease, and use as collateral, and (3) the right to exclude
others." On one hand, a property right is a right against the world,
since it confers enforceable rights to something on the owner. On
the other hand, the contents of the rights in the bundle differs
depending on whom it is asserted against based on the duties of
ownership conferred on the owner in the initial allocation.'
63. See generally PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 171-87 (describing different conflicts of
laws).
64. See id. at 489 (enumerating the four solutions currently available: (1) the
agreements contain explicit conflicts clauses, (2) the newer agreement governs (lex
posterior), (3) the specialized rule governs (lex specialis), or (4) the aggrieved party is
compensated).
65. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 15, at 27-28.
66. See, e.g., id.
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Neither is the bundle of rights static or constant in effect or
character, since each right itself confers the right on the owner to
change the relationship. In this sense the property right is defined
by contracts between the owner and others. However, there are
some "inherent defects" in all titles that the owner does not have
the power to correct. We focus on those next.
The property right is necessarily defined by its object. Unlike
a plot of land or physical object, defining the object of intellectual
property rights is notoriously difficult.67 Most other intangible
interests can be, at least conceptually, tied to some tangible form
of property, which in turn can be contrasted against the right. For
example, a bank holds a mortgage on a house only insofar as the
debt has not been paid, and a shareholder's interest is defined by
the existence and success of the company as well as the interests of
other shareholders. No one, generally, has a property right in the
subject matter from which a trademark is created; it is taken from
the pool of collective resources. At the same time, the object of the
right is distinct from the property right in the paper it is printed on,
the Web site that displays it, or the goods to which it is affixed.
Any attempt to contrast it with a tangible resource leads to a
misleading result, since they are not connected in the traditional
property law sense.'
"Possession" is another traditional approach to defining a
property right. It occurs when the resource is taken out of the
common pool.69 A landowner gains ownership by marking the
boundaries of her plot of land and claims ownership to wild horses
by capturing them and fencing them in. The trademark owner
claims a similar right when he initially uses the mark in commerce.
If no one else is using the same mark on the same goods, it is quite
easy for the public to accept the capture of a specific "plot" on the
market." However, much like a neighbor who is likely to object
when the landowner tries to expand the boundaries of her
property-or the community, when one family captures all the
67. See ROBIN JACOB & DANIEL ALEXANDER, A GUIDEBOOK TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 4-5 (Sweet & Maxwell
1993) (1970).
68. See Lemley, supra note 59, at 1033.
69. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, in PERSPECTIVES IN
PROPERTY LAW 181 (Ellickson et al. eds., 2002) (describing the common law notion of
"possession" or "occupancy" as the origin of property).
70. See generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 7, at 17-18 (stating the importance of
"use" in the establishment of trademark rights).
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horses-problems arise when the trademark owner adopts an
expansive interpretation of the right to exclude others. If these
conflicts were decided by whoever has possession, the
"encroacher" would naturally have the upper hand.7' However, in
a society with scarce resources, these conflicts are generally
decided by scrutinizing the original allocation of property rights
for inherent defects in title.72
In other words, the trademark right is defined by weighing it
against the public interest against allocating any right (to the
contested subject matter) to begin with. The object of contention is
separate from the initial allocation and does not affect the original
grant. In this sense each infringement action turns on whether or
not the trademark owner has a legitimate expectation in the
property interest sought. After all, a property right only has value
if it can be enforced against others.73
Legitimacy is derived from the initial grant as set forth by
trademark legislation. Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
affords the trademark owner the following rights:
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner's consent
from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for
goods or services which are identical or similar to those in
respect of which the trademark is registered where such use
would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of
an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of
confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall
not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the
possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of
use.
The international minimum standard of trademark protection
only applies to registered marks even though Member States are
allowed to afford additional protection based on use of a mark. A
71. The encroachment on a trademark is similar to a claim of adverse possession. See,
e.g., Carrier, supra note 11, at 58-59 (describing how adverse possessors were favored by
the law as a means to encourage productive use of land).
72. For example, John Locke's theory on allocation views property rights as an
extension of labor and presumes that it is immoral to take too much. See JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 300-02 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690); see also Rose, supra note 69, at 180.
73. See Demsetz, supra note 57, at 347, 355. Ownership has no value if anyone can
take the object of ownership from its owner or the owner has no conceivable means of
enforcing his right. See id.
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mark that has become well-known through extended use (after
registration) is awarded extended protection.7 ' The initial grant of
an exclusive right is thus subject to four inherent defects in title;
the owner only can prevent a third party from using a mark (1) in
commerce, (2) as a trade or service mark, (3) on identical or
similar goods, and (4) where the use results in a likelihood of
confusion." The chosen language clearly indicates that the factors
are cumulative.
In addition to affording a limited right, the TRIPS Agreement
acknowledges that the trademark right confers certain rights and
duties on the trademark owner. Member States may impose a
requirement of use (and most do) and renewal in order to
maintain the registration, but a trademark registration shall, in
principle, be renewable indefinitely. 6 The use of a trademark shall
not be unjustifiably burdened with special requirements, nor can it
ever be subject to a compulsory license." In addition, licensing and
assignment of a trademark shall be possible with or without
transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs. 8
III. THE DEROGATION ALLOWED FROM AFFORDED RIGHTS
UNDER ARTICLE 17
A. Introduction
The last section concerned the inherent constraints on the
afforded right. This section concerns the right of the government
to regulate in ways that affect the exercise of trademark rights.
The distinction between allocation and exercise of a right is not
necessarily clear in practice. However, national laws generally
acknowledge this distinction through evidentiary rules. Since
registration serves as notice on third parties the legitimacy of the
trademark owner's interest is presumed for what is registered.79
The trademark owner must prove his entitlement to any additional
protection. Only when the trademark owner has a legitimate
interest in the exclusive use of a mark does the defendant's duty to
furnish evidence in his defense kick in.
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16, para. 3.
75. Id. art. 16, paras. 1, 3
76. Id. arts. 18-19.
77. Id. arts. 20-21.
78. Id. art. 21.
79. See id. art. 16.
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The logic of this analytical structure operates with a twist on
the international level. Under the TRIPS Agreement, Member
States are only mandated to provide minimum protection to
trademark owners, unless the principles of national treatment or
most favored nation are violated." Hence, additional protection is
not mandated but a choice which in turn can trigger certain duties,
namely that of equal treatment. The paramount question of law
when considering the arbitrariness of the deprivation remains
whether or not the Member State is in violation of its international
obligation to provide a minimum standard of protection for
trademarks. Like the question in the property cases above, the
inquiry includes two parts: (1) is a legitimate property interest at
stake? and (2) is the deprivation arbitrary or illegitimate?
Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement reads as follows:
"Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred
by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that
such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the
trademark owner and of third parties."
Hence, the exclusive right afforded in Article 16(1) can be
subject to limited exceptions. In other words, even if all four
elements of Article 16 (1) are satisfied and a mark is used in
commerce on identical or similar goods in a way that causes a
likelihood of confusion, the use may nonetheless be lawful.
B. European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs
1. Does Article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement Provide an Exception
to Trademark Rights?
The proposed conceptual structure of international trademark
law is useful in assessing the above-mentioned Panel Report
regarding the protection of trademarks and GIs under the TRIPS
Agreement. The GI-report interpreted Articles 24.5, 24.3, and 17
of the TRIPS Agreement, since the European Communities raised
them as a defense of its legislation regarding GIs,1 in response to
80. Id. arts. 3-4.
81. Compare Council Regulation 2081/92, arts. 10-14, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, 1-8 (EC),
with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 17, 24.
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complaints by Australia and the United States that the EC
violated Article 16(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. 2
The EC legislation confers an implied right to use a GI in
relation to the relevant products upon registration. 3 Article 14(2)
of the regulation allows for the continued use of trademarks that
were registered prior to the registration of a GI. In addition,
Article 14(3) of the regulation provides that the registration of a
GI shall be refused if it leads to a likelihood of confusion with an
earlier trademark. Notwithstanding Article 14(3) of the regulation,
the main argument set forth by the complainants is that the
trademark rights afforded under Article 16(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement cannot be fully exercised against a person who uses a
registered GI in accordance with the right conferred by
registration.' The EC, on the other hand, claims that Article 14(2)
is necessary to implement its obligations under Article 24 of the
TRIPS Agreement."5
Article 24 sets forth the minimum standard of GI protection
in the TRIPS Agreement. Article 24.5 limits the reach of GI
protection that a Member State may afford in relation to existing
trademarks, the exclusive rights to which have been acquired prior
to the protection of the GI in its home country. The Panel rejected
the argument that Article 24.5 is exhaustive in the sense that
Member States under the TRIPS agreement are free to limit the
use of trademarks that have been acquired after a GI is protected
in its home country." Likewise the Panel rejected the argument
that a Member State is obligated under Article 24 to afford such
GI protection.'
The Panel concluded that Article 24.5 creates an exception to
GI protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement and also that,
notwithstanding Article 24, Members States are required under
Article 16(1) to make available the right to exclude certain uses,
which includes uses as a GI.' The GI-Panel arrived at this
conclusion by way of interpreting the words "when implementing
82. EC Panel Report, supra note 6, 7.627-.686.
83. Traditionally, however, this has been interpreted in civil law countries as granting
an implied right to use. See EC Panel Report, supra note 6, 7.521. Compare EC Panel
Report, supra note 6, 7.522, with Council Regulation 2081/92, art. 13.
84. EC Panel Report, supra note 6, J[ 7.531.
85. Id. 7.525.
86. Id. IT 7.624-.625.
87. See id. [1[ 7.617-.619.
88. Id. 7.625.
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this section" in Articles 24.3 and 24.5 to render the conferred
obligations inapplicable in relation to other obligations in the
TRIPS Agreement. Since the obligation to afford trademark
protection is found in section 2 of the TRIPS agreement (without a
similar qualifier), any obligation of coexistence cannot be
presumed.89 The GI-Panel concluded that they refuse to adopt an
approach to treaty interpretation, which is not supported by the
ordinary meaning of its terms in their context."
2. Exceptions under Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement
According to Article 17 the GI-Panel recognized two
elements that the national legislation must satisfy: (1) the
exceptions must be limited and (2) must take into account the
legitimate interests of the trademark owner and of third parties.
Any interpretation of either element that excludes the example
"fair use of descriptive terms" is necessarily incorrect."
The GI-Panel relied upon the interpretation by two previous
panels regarding exceptions to copyrights and patents." However,
there are some significant differences between these provisions,
requiring interpretation of Article 17 "according to its own terms."
[U]nlike the other provisions Article 17 contains no reference
to 'conflict with a [or the] normal exploitation,' no reference to
'unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests' of the right
holder or owner, and it not only refers to the legitimate
interests of third parties but treats them on par with those of the
right holder.93
Article 17 clearly permits exceptions that are not applicable
to other intellectual property rights."
In ascertaining the meaning of the term "limited exceptions"
the GI-Panel concluded that the issue is whether the exception to
89. Id. 7.606, 7.632.
90. Id. 7.624.
91. Id. 7.648.
92. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Patent Panel Report] (interpreting
exceptions to patent regulations under article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement); Panel Report,
United States- Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 26-29, VT/DS160/R (June 15,
2000) [hereinafter U.S. Copyright Panel Report] (interpreting exceptions to copyright
regulations under article thirteen of the TRIPS Agreement).
93. EC Panel Report, supra note 6, J1 7.649.
94. Id. J 7.649.
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the rights conferred by a trademark is narrow." Exceptions may
apply to (1) the category of third parties, (2) the identity or
similarity of the marks or goods, (3) the degree of likelihood of
confusion, (4) a combination of the above, or (5) in some other
way, as long as they are limited. The Panel noted that
Fair use of descriptive terms is not limited in terms of the
number of third parties who may benefit, nor in terms of the
quantity of goods or services with respect to which they use the
descriptive terms, although implicitly it only applies to those
third parties who would use those terms in the course of trade
and to those foods or services which those terms describe.96
Still, it satisfies the elements of Article 17.
The number of trademarks or trademark owners affected is
irrelevant. 7 Thus, the focus remains on the impact on the rights of
the trademark owner. Although the quantity of goods that benefit
from an exception might indirectly curtail the exercise of the right
to exclude others, preventing acts of making, selling or importing
goods are not rights conferred by a trademark.98 The trademark
right only entails the right to prevent confusing uses.99 On the other
hand, the GI-Panel noted that "GI registration does not confer a
positive right to use any other signs or combinations of signs nor to
use the name in any linguistic versions. '0 0. Hence, the trademark
owner's rights are not limited against such uses. Likewise, the GI
regulation recognizes a ground for refusal of registration based on
an earlier trademark."°' Therefore, the trademark owner's right to
exclude confusing uses is not completely diminished even against
the GI applicant.
3. Legitimate interests
Following a contextual approach, the GI-Panel concluded
that the legitimate interests of the trademark owner must be
something different from the full enjoyment of the rights conferred
95. Id. 7.650. See Canada Patent Panel Report, supra note 92, 7.30 (noting that
relevant inquiry focuses on exceptions to the rights conferred, not to a set of trademarks
or trademark owners).
96. EC Panel Report, supra note 6, 91 7.654.
97. Id. 9[ 7.655.
98. Id. 7.656.
99. Id.
100. Id. 7.657.
101. Id. 91 7.658.
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by a trademark." Equally, the legitimate interests of third parties
must be something more than simple enjoyment of their legal
rights.' Citing Canada-Pharmaceuticals Patents, the GI-Panel
concluded that the provision calls "for protection of interests that
are 'justifiable' in the sense that they are supported by relevant
public policies and other social norms."'°
The GI-Panel referred to the WTO Members' shared
understandings of the policies and norms relevant to trademarks
when concluding that the protected function of trademarks is the
ability to distinguish goods and services from those of other
companies in the course of trade." While it is in the legitimate
interest of the trademark owner to receive protection of the source
identifying function of its trademark, protection is not absolute.'"
Compared to Articles 13, 26.2, and 30, which refer to
"unreasonable prejudice," Article 17 only requires that exceptions
"take account" of the legitimate interests of the owner. 7
According to the GI-Panel the chosen wording suggests that less
protection is required for the legitimate interests of the trademark
owner. 8 This reading also corresponds with the absence of specific
reference to the rights of third parties in Articles 13, 26.2, and 30.
The GI-Panel further notes that the relevant third parties for
the purposes of Article 17 include both consumers and persons
using a geographical indication. 9 After all, the legitimacy of the
interests of GI users is reflected in the TRIPS Agreement itself."'
The Panel defines the legitimate interest of GI owners by
contrasting Articles 22 and 23 of the TRIPS Agreement, in which
the legal protection of GIs are described." Furthermore, the GI-
Panel analogizes to the example in Article 17 concluding that GI
protection serves a similar purpose and is therefore legitimate. 2
102. Id. 7.662.
103. Id.
104. Id. 1 7.663 (citing Canada Patent Panel Report, supra note 92, 7.69).
105. Id. 1 7.664.
106. Id. 7.670.
107. Id. [ 7.671.
10& Id.
109. Id. IT 7.675, 7.679.
110. Id. 7.680
111. Id.
112. Id. 7.681.
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IV. THE CONTEXTUAL AND STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. The Framework of International Law and International Trade
The TRIPS Agreement is part of a larger framework of
treaties that regulate international trade under the auspices of the
WTO.'3 The underlying purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. The
means employed to reach this goal are securing effective and
adequate protection of IPRs while ensuring that the measures and
procedures to enforce IPRs do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade."' According to Article 7, the objective of the
TRIPS Agreement is to "contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation.., to the mutual advantage of producers
and users .. .in a manner conducive to the social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.". 5
Furthermore, Article 8 shows deference to Member States in
formulating and amending laws and adopting measures necessary
to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development. 1 6 With the
objective and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement in mind the
Member States adopted the following international obligation:
Article 1
Nature and Scope of Obligations
1. Members shall give effect to the provisions of this
Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does
not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall
be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
and practice.
Adopting minimum standards of protection follows the
traditional format of international agreements. After all, it is
notoriously difficult to reach consensus on an adequate level of
protection between more than 150 different legal systems while
113. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, annexes 1A-1C, 2.
114. Id., pmbl.
115. Id. art. 7.
116. Id. art. 8.
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maintaining a level that has any practical effect."'7 In addition,
great deference is shown to the Member States in implementing
the provisions of the treaty, both in the means chosen as well as in
the level of protection in practice, provided that it is higher than
the minimum level of protection.1' Lastly, it should be noted that
while Member States agreed on the issue of granting protection,
they excluded from consideration the issue of when the rights
afforded under the TRIPS Agreement are exhausted.119
To give added force to the international trade rules, the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") was annexed to the agreement
establishing the WTO, to govern all disputes between Member
States.' DSU Article 3.2 states that the WTO dispute settlement
system "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members
under the . .'. agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law." 121 Recommendations
and rulings cannot add or diminish those rights and obligations.12
In United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, the Appellate Body confirmed that Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties incorporates the
customary rules of public international law 12
Customary rules of public international law mandate that "a
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
117. See Rubens Ricupero, Rebuilding Confidence in the Multilateral Trading System:
Closing the "Legitimacy Gap," in THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 37-38 (describing problems facing the WTO
despite adoption of minimum standards).
118. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 134.
119. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6 (stating the principles of national
treatment and most-favored nation cannot be invoked in dispute settlement regarding the
issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights).
120. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 122
(1994) [hereinafter DSU].
121. Id. art. 3(2).
122. See id. art. 3(5).
123. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 15-16, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Standards
Appellate Body Report].
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context and in the light of its objective and purpose.' ' .4 The
relevant context is composed of the text, preamble, annexes, and
any other agreement relating to the treaty between the same
parties.'25 Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation is
only allowed when the contextual interpretation leaves the
meaning ambiguous or leads to a manifestly absurd or
unreasonable result.'26 Customary international law thus provides
different tools of interpretation for different conflicts within
international jurisdiction and also draws the line between national
and international jurisdiction.'27
The requirement of good faith interpretation has traditionally
been construed to mandate narrow interpretation of treaty
provisions and exclude e contrario conclusions regarding the
intentions of Member States in international law.'28 However, in
light of the objective and purpose of the treaty, the contextual
approach secures an interpretation that gives all provisions some
effect. The universally recognized principle of pacta sunt servanda
mandates that the text of the treaty is binding upon the parties and
cannot be watered down by subsequent interpretation.29
In sum, international law operates much like contract law,
which is premised on the principles of contractual freedom on the
one hand and strict (legal or diplomatic) enforcement of
contractual obligations on the other. Commitment to the system of
international law, however, does not allow for parties to opt out of
all of their obligations. Because there is no hierarchy of treaties,
the unity of international law is what lends legitimacy to
international law. Unless a Member State explicitly contracts out
of an international obligation, it is presumptively bound by that
obligation in all other contractual relationships.'30
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body
Report, supra note 8, at 1 104, 111.
125. Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 31.
126. Id. art. 32.
127. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 441-43.
128. See generally id. at 465.
129. See Vienna Convention, supra note 124, pmbl. (noting the principles of free
consent and good faith and pacta sunt servanda are universally recognized).
130. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 461-67 (citing Panel Report, Korea -
Government Procurement, T 7.101 n.755, WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000)).
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B. The Evolution of International Norms and the Status of WTO
Panel Reports
The function of WTO panels is to assist the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") by making an objective assessment of
the facts at hand and their applicability and conformity with the
relevant agreements.' Nowadays, WTO panel reports as well as
Appellate Body reports are semi-automatically adopted by the
DSB and subsequently obtain the status of an authoritative
statement of international law.'32 How then should the WTO panel
reports be interpreted and what reach should the rulings be given?
This section will ascertain the binding force or effect of a
panel ruling as a contribution to the body of international trade
law.'33 According to the DSU the purpose of the dispute settlement
system and hence the rulings set forth by it is to provide "security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system."''" Much like
any other decision-making body in a rule-oriented (as opposed to
policy-based) system, the WTO system cannot be successful unless
three goals are met: the system must be viewed by the Member
States as (1) just, (2) credible, and (3) efficient.' 35 All panel rulings
and rationales are thus subject to intense scrutiny. Consequently,
WTO panels have sought to adopt an analytical, objective, and
nonpolitical procedure that is firmly anchored in principles of
international law.'36 While clearly aware of their larger audience in
aspects of procedure and form, it seems unclear what substantive
reach (source value) is to be given to the rulings of WTO panels.
Due to the above-mentioned concerns the approach of WTO
panels is necessarily formalistic in the sense that panels will rely
heavily on treaty text as well as perceived neutral sources of
interpretation. Certain WTO panels have, however, taken a highly
formalistic, almost exclusively literal approach, to interpretation of
131. DSU, supra note 120, art. 11.
132. DSU, supra note 120, arts. 16(4), 17(14).
133. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997); Warren
F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002). See generally
Judith Hippler Bello, Commentary, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is
More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416 (1996) (discussing to what extent the WTO's rules
enforcement affects Members' obligation to comply in practice).
134. DSU, supra note 120, art. 3(2).
135. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 134, 161.
136. Id. at 134, 160.
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the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.'37 What weight should
these reports or statements have as a source of law?
In Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages the Appellate Body
considered whether prior reports constitute "subsequent practice"
for purposes of treaty interpretation within the meaning of Article
31 of the Vienna Convention.'38 The Appellate Body held that the
decision to adopt a panel report neither constitutes agreement on
the reasoning by that panel, nor elevates the report to a binding
source of law on subsequent panels.'39 Reports are only binding
with respect to resolving a particular dispute between the parties.
Nevertheless, panel reports should be taken into account because
they may create legitimate expectations among Member States.' °
Furthermore, the correct interpretative approach under the
Vienna Convention follows the general principle of effectiveness
of treaty interpretation. 4' Although the correct approach to any
provision is textual, interpretation should always rest on the
objective and purpose of provisions, i.e. respecting the words while
not diminishing the meaning of words actually used in other
provisions. Any provision should be read in light of the broad and
fundamental purpose of that provision that gives meaning and
effect to all of its terms.' 2
The Appellate Body has further elaborated on rules of treaty
interpretation in US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products.4 ' Any measure that is subject to a violation
complaint"' should be scrutinized in light of its meaning and effect
137. Canada Patent Panel Report, supra note 92 (interpreting exceptions to patent
regulations under article thirty of the TRIPS Agreement); U.S. Copyright Panel Report,
supra note 92 (interpreting exceptions to copyright regulations under article thirteen of
the TRIPS Agreement), see EC Panel Report, supra note 6.
138. See Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan
Taxes Appellate Body Report].
139. See id. The Appellate body relied on Article IX(2) of the WTO Agreement as
well as DSU article 3.9, which retains the exclusive authority to issue definite treaty
interpretations to the General Ministerial Council by a three-fourths majority vote. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
144. At present, violation complaints are the only form of complaint under the TRIPS
agreement, since the TRIPS Council has been unable to agree on the permissibility of
non-violation complaints. See, e.g., Developing Country Group, TRIPS and Public Health,
42 (World Trade Org., Working Paper, June 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/trips-e/paper_developw296_e.htm (discussing access to medicine); see
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in relation to the relevant international obligations of the Member-
State in question, not with a focus on the nature or design of the
measure itself.4 ' Furthermore, maintaining the multilateral trading
system is not a right or obligation per se, instead each provision
should be reviewed in light of the object and purpose of the
provision itself. Thus, generally testing a measure for consistency
with the object and purpose of the treaty exceeds the jurisdiction
of the panels." Nevertheless, the result of the interpretative
approach must lead to a test or standard that is justifiable under
the agreement.17 Consequently, absent express wording on point,
terms of the treaty must nonetheless be read in light of
contemporary concerns among the Member States as expressed,
e.g., in the preamble of the agreement.4
Finally, the Appellate Body has expressly stated that Member
States "should not be assumed . . . to have continued previous
protection or discrimination through the adoption of a new
measure", since this would amount to a presumption of bad faith
that is inconsistent with the general nature of international law. "
However, the policy goal of a measure, no matter how noble,
cannot provide its justification, if it does not meet the general
requirements for an exemption.' ° Total deference to Member
States cannot ensure an objective assessment under Article 3.2 of
the DSU.''
In any search for a meaning of a treaty, treaty interpretation
should be seen as a tool for conflict avoidance. 2 As mentioned
above, conflicts can generally be categorized as false conflicts, true
also GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY 847-48 (2001) (noting the fact that non-violation complaints are not available
also constrains panel jurisdiction in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement).
145. U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 114-15.
146. Id. 1 116.
147. Id. 121.
148. Id. 129.
149. See Appellate Body Report, Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, $1 74,
WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R (Dec. 13, 1999).
150. U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 1 149.
151. Cf DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 86 (1999) (citing Panel
Report, United States- Restrictions on Import of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear,
$ 7.10, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996) (adopted Feb. 10, 1997) (stating that a "policy of total
deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an 'objective
assessment' as envisioned by Article 11").
152. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 244-45.
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apparent conflicts, and genuine conflicts. 3 While the former two
can be solved by recourse to treaty interpretation, genuine
conflicts are outside the jurisdiction of WTO panels."' However,
no conflict can even hypothetically exist if (1) the language of the
provision in question is not broad or ambiguous enough to allow
input from other provisions regarding its meaning and (2) the
second rule in question does not express anything about what the
first one means.'55 This rule stems from the prohibition under
customary international law of interpretations contra legem. 6
False conflicts can be solved by reference to the principle of
efficient treaty interpretation. The provisions are interpreted in
good faith in light of their objective and purpose. No meaning can
be given to the provisions that would be contrary to their "letter
and spirit..1 7 Hence, words cannot be interpreted into nor out of a
treaty provision.18 Efficient treaty interpretation is only
permissible to the extent that a harmonious result can be reached.
Whether the result is in favor of the first or second provision is
irrelevant.
True conflicts, on the other hand, require reference to norms
outside the text of the treaty in order to determine whether the
solution of the conflict is within international jurisdiction.'59 True
apparent conflicts generally are within international jurisdiction
(although decision-making authority can have been withheld from
the WTO panels). However, genuine conflicts can only be resolved
by way of amendment of the treaty."
V. EVALUATION OF THE GI PANEL REPORT IN LIGHT OF THE
PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The GI-Panel arguably was in a difficult position, since the
collision between the interests of trademark owners and GI
153. See discussion supra note 63.
154. PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 272.
155. Id. at 245.
156. See id. Conflicts (false, apparent or genuine) only arise, if a bona fide
interpretation of the text of the allegedly conflicting provisions appears to create a
conflict. See id.
157. See id. at 248; U.S. Standards Appellate Body Report, supra note 123, at 23; Japan
Taxes Appellate Body Report, supra note 138, at 12.
158. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 249.
159. See generally id. at 251-68 (discussing how the Appellate Body has viewed articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention and norms of international law in preventing genuine
conflicts from arising).
160. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 248-49, 272.
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owners are one of the most contested issues in the international
arena. In its final analysis, the GI-Panel correctly focused the
analysis on the rights afforded and the effect of the limitation on
the underlying property interest. However, the GI-Panel failed to
distinguish the rights afforded from those withheld in relation to
GI holders16' and consequently failed to distinguish between
deprivations per se (exceptions that should not be analyzed under
Article 17 because no legitimate property interest is deprived) and
arbitrary or illegitimate deprivations (exceptions that should be
analyzed under Article 17).
In other words, the GI-Panel should have asked whether
trademark owners have a legitimate interest in excluding GI users
and weighed this interest against the legitimacy of the interest of
GI users in receiving protection. At this juncture, the GI-Panel
should have distinguished between the legitimate interests of
existing trademark owners and prospective trademark owners in
the relevant market and accordingly weighed how the regulation
protected their respective interests against existing and prospective
GI users. After all, sweeping generalizations regarding the
legitimate interest of the trademark owner as well as a GI owner
are unadvisable since they, like all property rights, vary according
to whom it is asserted against. The distinction is supported by the
text of the treaty since Article 24.5, the exception to GI protection
in favor of trademark owners, only applies to existing trademark
owners in relation to prospective GI users. A reading that does not
make the distinction renders Article 24.5 meaningless, a
conclusion that can never be supported under the international
rules on treaty interpretation. '62
Secondly, Article 17 clearly includes a static dimension, i.e.
Member States are allowed to maintain existing limitations on
trademark rights. The question to what extent Member States are
161. The Panel treated this discussion as non-relational in the sense that it focused on
what interests the trademark owner had in protecting, as opposed to legitimate interests
and what interest GI users had in limiting the trademark owner's right. The Panel did not
take the necessary third step; i.e. Article 17 expressly mandates that legitimacy of interests
be assessed in relation to the interests of third parties. This is not meant to say that the
Panel should not have weighed the effect of the "deprivation" in relation to the rights the
trademark owner retained despite GIs. Indeed, the degree of "deprivation" is an
important component when assessing the fairness of the balance struck.
162. U.S. Standards Appellate Body Report, supra note 123, at 23.
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allowed to introduce new exceptions to trademark rights under the
TRIPS Agreement is arguably more controversial.'63
Despite the adopted contextual approach, the GI-Panel
arguably treated Article 17 as well as the TRIPS Agreement itself
as only including a static dimension, i.e. a fixed allocation of rights
and duties. The GI-Panel took the standard of protection
expressed in the TRIPS Agreement as the starting point for its
analysis when evaluating whether the exceptions were limited and
whether the interests of the parties were legitimate. Hence, the
limited scope of the exception was ascertained by contrasting it to
the international minimum standard of protection, and the
legitimacy of interests of third parties was ascertained by equating
the interest to the international minimum standard of protection
and subjecting it to the provision of Article 17.
Member States, however, are entitled to grant more
protection for IPRs than the international minimum standard set
forth in the TRIPS Agreement. " Most Western nations do, and
the Member States of the European Community grant higher
levels of protection to both trademarks and GIs than mandated by
the TRIPS Agreement. In other words, while the TRIPS
Agreement mandates that Member States afford some level of
protection for trademarks as well as GIs, an e contrario conclusion
is not permissible under international law: the TRIPS Agreement
does not mandate protection only to the extent afforded by its
provisions.
163. According to the GI-Panel's reading of Article 24, this issue is and is not governed
by international obligations. See EC Panel Report, supra note 6, 99 7.634-.636. The TRIPS
Agreement mandates protection of trademarks and GIs, but only insofar as the latter does
not encroach on the exercise of the former. See id. The GI-Panel thus created a hierarchy
of IPRs and seemed to treat the issue of compliance as one of fact, not of law, when
concluding that the EC regulation did not impact the exercise of trademark rights so as to
render the exception too broad to qualify under Article 17. See id. 1 7.644-.688. The
Panel should as a matter of law (compare to Article 1.1) have shown deference to the
Member State and started from the factual presumption that the measure, at least in part,
was mandated by Article 24 of TRIPS. After all, the European Community had not
previously offered any GI protection under its post-TRIPS regulations prior to January 1,
1995. See id. 9 7.636. It is at least questionable, whether the GI-Panel had jurisdiction to
interpret the TRIPS Agreement so as to alter the delicate balance struck in the
negotiations that led to TRIPS. Under international law genuine conflicts cannot be
solved by way of interpretation. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 272.
164. See TRIPS Agireement, supra note 1, art. 1.1. Even regarding GI protection, the
TRIPS Agreement can hardly objectively be read as having concluded that, for example,
France and Italy agreed to lower their existing GI protection based on their obligation
under Article 16(1).
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The GI-Panel treated the minimum standard of protection
afforded to GIs under the TRIPS Agreement as a "ceiling" in the
sense that it only recognized these interests as legitimate, and
analytically subordinated these interests to those of trademark
owners by viewing minimum GI protection as an exception. The
GI-Panel, as panels before it had done regarding copyright and
patents, used a standard similar to viewing third party use as
interfering with "normal exploitation" or creating "unreasonable
prejudice" to the interests of the trademark owner. However,
Article 17 explicitly shows deference to national legislatures to
strike a fair balance between competing equal interests. 5 A proper
inquiry under international law would have treated the protection
afforded to GIs under the TRIPS Agreement as a "floor" and
scrutinized only the legitimacy of interests behind national
legislation granting additional protection in light of the
international minimum standard of trademark protection.
The theory of allocation of trademark rights based on a use-
based property system explains the relationships between rights
embedded in the TRIPS Agreement. Keeping in mind the
necessary link between property rights allocation and enforcement
it is inevitable that only governments can allocate trademark rights
for their respective territories.'" It is within national jurisdiction to
strike the final balance between the rights of trademark owners
and third parties, since genuine conflicts can only be solved
internationally by consensus, i.e. treaty amendment. In striking
this balance, international law mandates that partial protection,
and not absolute protection, be given to IPRs.
On the other hand, international law is the flip side of
national law: obligations are allocated instead of rights. Contrary
to the findings of the GI-Panel, it therefore naturally follows that
the coexistence of all obligations is the norm.' After all, a contract
165. Cf TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1.2.
166. Cf Lemley, supra note 59, at 1072-73 (analogizing intellectual property to
government-created subsidies).
167. The GI-Panel noted that the parties had not alleged a conflict between Article 16,
section 1, and Article 24. EC Panel Report, supra note 6, 7.624. Citing previous reports,
the GI-panel recognized that there is a general presumption in international law against
conflicts. Id. 1 7.605, 7.624. These holdings, in which Member States raised a defense
alleging conflict between obligations under different agreements, confirm the general
principle of efficiency of treaty interpretation that presumes coexistence of treaty
obligations and only supports a finding of formal conflict when an interpretation that
avoids conflict is impossible. Panel Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile
and Clothing Products, IT 9.92-.95, WT[DS34/R (May 31, 1999); Appellate Body Report,
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is meaningless if a signatory can reap the benefits of international
cooperation but opt out of its obligations. Hence an international
instrument cannot be interpreted to allow one or some rights
allocations at the national level to become supreme without
destroying the system of international law. Instead all treaty
interpretation should rest on the presumption of coexistence and
conflict avoidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The TRIPS Agreement does not create an island of
international intellectual property law that is isolated from both
national and general international law. Instead its provisions
should be interpreted in light of the agreement as a whole as well
as its practical and contextual framework, according to established
principles of customary international law. There are inherent limits
to treaty interpretation imbedded in the rules of international
jurisdiction and generally great deference should be shown to
national legislatures in implementing the country's international
obligations.
Viewing trademark rights as property rights can be both
helpful and misleading on the international level. Acknowledging
that property rights are inherently relational as well as subject to
limitation in the public interest may prove useful when
interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, especially
when the interests of holders of different IPRs are in potential
conflict. Approaching the TRIPS Agreement as a complex system
of rights allocation, instead of from the point of view of the
individual rights holder, results in a more efficient use of all
resources. A system premised on the coexistence of multiple users
Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 91 14.28, W1T/DS54/R
(July 2, 1998). The GI-Panel seems to conclude that since there is no formal conflict, there
is no obligation under international law to consider the relationship between two
provisions in the same treaty. The cited cases set forth the principle of coexistence of
obligations as well as the rule of conflict-avoidance as general rules in treaty
interpretation. These rules apply in all treaty interpretation regardless of whether a formal
conflict is even alleged. See PAUWELYN, supra note 3, at 244. The GI-panel instead
resorted to a purely literal interpretation of the text of the TRIPS Agreement according to
the ordinary meaning of the words used. See EC Panel Report, supra note 6, T1 7.620. A
situation where WTO Panels has and thus legitimately can show less deference to national
decisions is when the decision undermines the effectiveness of WTO rules, and could
trigger damaging activities in other Member States. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 161.
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of closely connected, yet distinguishable rights, naturally produces
the most efficient result that the market can sustain.
WTO Panels should therefore tread carefully in areas of
political contention applying a contextual approach to treaty
interpretation based on an objective assessment of the obligations
in the concluded agreement. Although the allocation of obligations
in the TRIPS Agreement in this sense is static, interpretation
should remain flexible for the purposes of continued development
of national legislation in the field of intellectual property law.
Promoting the gradual increase in standards of protection of IPRs
on the global level is, after all, the objective and purpose of the
TRIPS Agreement.
